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Abstract
The extent to which people learning categories generalize on
the basis of observed instances should depend in part on their
beliefs about how the instances were sampled from the world.
Bayesian models of sampling have been successful in predict-
ing the counter-intuitive finding that under certain situations
generalization can decrease as more instances of a category
are encountered. This has only been shown in tasks were in-
stances are all from the same category, but contrasts with the
predictions from most standard models of categorization (such
as the Generalized Context Model) that predict when multiple
categories exist, people are more likely to generalize to cate-
gories that have more instances when distances between cate-
gories is controlled. In this current work we show that in both
one- and two-category scenarios, people adjust their general-
ization behavior based on cover story and number of instances.
These patterns of generalization at an individual level for both
one- and two-category scenarios were well accounted for by a
Bayesian model that relies on a mixture of sampling assump-
tions.
Keywords: sampling assumptions, generalization, category
learning
Introduction
The ability to generalize beyond existing data is a basic cog-
nitive capacity that underlies a great deal of human learn-
ing, categorization and decision-making (e.g. Shepard, 1987;
Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Nosofsky, 1986). To complete
the inductive leap needed for generalization, people must
make some kinds of assumptions about how that data was
generated or sampled. A learner’s sampling assumptions in-
fluence the evidentiary value of the data, and thus alters what
they should infer based on it.
One natural assumption is that each observed datum has
been selected independently and then labeled as a member
(or not) of the category or concept to be learned. An example
of this is a parent who tries to teach a child what a “ball” is by
randomly picking from all of the toys her room then labelling
them as balls or not. This possibility, called weak sampling,
implies that all observations x are equally likely, regardless of
what hypothesis h the learner has about the category. Mathe-
matically, this corresponds to the notion that P(x|h) ∝ 1.
A different type of data generation, known as strong sam-
pling, presumes that the data has been selected as a random
positive example directly from the category to be learned
(Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). A parent who teaches the
word “ball” by showing the child many different kinds of
balls (but not other toys) is strongly sampling from the cat-
egory of BALL. The key consequence of strong sampling is
that it licenses tighter generalizations with increasing data.
This is because each datapoint is more informative about the
boundaries of the category. Mathematically, for a hypothesis
h that consists of |h| possible category members, the strong
sampling model implies that P(x|h) = 1/|h| if the observa-
tion x falls within the category, and 0 if it does not.
There is evidence that people are sensitive to sampling as-
sumptions, making tighter generalizations when the data ap-
pear to have been strongly sampled (e.g. Xu & Tenenbaum,
2007). However, a number of questions remain unresolved,
two of which we address in this paper.
The first, more minor, issue relates to the influence of the
cover story. As mentioned, work by Xu and Tenenbaum
(2007) suggests that both adults and children change their
generalization patterns in response to differences in sampling.
This appears to contrast with other work by Navarro, Dry, and
Lee (2012), which found that although sampling assumptions
varied between individual participants (with some assuming
strong sampling and others weak), people did not change their
behavior according to the cover story they were presented
with. One way to resolve the discrepancy between these two
studies is to conclude that the data generation process was
much more obvious in Xu and Tenenbaum (2007). In that
study, participants actually saw instances selected in front of
them, whereas in Navarro et al. (2012) participants simply
read different cover stories. Here we explore whether it is
necessary for people to see data being generated in order to
change their sampling assumptions, or whether a more salient
cover story manipulation would be sufficient.
The second issue we investigate is a more important and
more puzzling one. It is generally acknowledged that induc-
tive generalization is very closely linked to categorization.
For instance, exemplar models of categorization (e.g., Nosof-
sky, 1986) are constructed by assuming that the learner uses
a simple probabilistic model to generalize from each stored
exemplar to a target item. The “narrowness” of the gener-
alizations is a fixed parameter (referred to as the specificity)
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Figure 1: Different predictions made by a standard categorization model (the GCM) and a Bayesian model that incorporates a
strong sampling assumption. The GCM, on the left panel, predicts that as the number of instances in a category increases (shown
in the figure by the additional points in the bottom row), generalizations should loosen slightly: the solid line corresponding
to generalizations based on later additional instances in Category A extends further from Category A. By contrast, the model
incorporating strong sampling predicts that generalization based on additional instances will tighten: the solid line in the right
panel is much closer to Category A than the dotted line corresponding to earlier, fewer instances.
and does not change as the sample size increases. This is ef-
fectively a weak sampling assumption, and it is assumed by
both the basic Generalized Context Model (Nosofsky, 1986)
and by models such as ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) that ex-
tend it. These models have proven highly successful at de-
scribing human classification behavior, apparently with little
need to adapt them to incorporate some version of the strong
sampling assumption. If human learners are as sensitive to
sampling assumptions as papers such as Xu and Tenenbaum
(2007) imply, why has it not been necessary to incorporate
such assumptions into existing categorization models?
We can think of at least two possible (not mutually exclu-
sive) explanations for this. The first one is that sampling ef-
fects have not been found simply because few studies have
gone looking for them. Standard supervised classification
designs do not manipulate the sampling assumptions, and it
could be argued that the instructions and design of such ex-
periments often imply weak sampling. As such, it is natural
to expect that the theories used to explain these experiments
would implicitly rely on weak sampling assumptions. A sim-
ilar suggestion is made by Hsu and Griffiths (2010).
An alternate possibility is that these divergent results arise
because of a genuine difference in the nature of the experi-
ments: the number of categories involved. Typical catego-
rization experiments generally involve two categories, with
stimuli needing to be classified as belonging to one or the
other (Nosofsky, 1986). In contrast, researchers testing sam-
pling assumptions have tended to use tasks in which partici-
pants are asked to draw inferences about only a single target
category (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; Navarro et al., 2012).
In this paper we test the latter possibility by making use
of the fact that strong sampling models make a different pre-
diction from standard categorization models in certain situa-
tions. A multiple-category version of a Bayesian generaliza-
tion model with strong sampling1 predicts that if we increase
the number of instances in Category A without changing the
number of exemplars in the other category, items that lie in
between the two categories should decrease in their probabil-
ity of being classified as members of Category A. This is be-
cause strong sampling leads to tighter generalization of Cat-
egory A with more instances, (right panel of Figure 1). Note
further that this is the opposite of what one would expect from
a standard exemplar model: adding more exemplars to Cat-
egory A but not to the other category can only increase the
summed similarity between Category A exemplars and a tar-
get item. As a consequence, items that lie between the two
categories should increase in their probability of being clas-
sified as members of Category A (left panel of Figure 1).
These distinct predictions motivate our experiment: we
present learners with either one-category or two-category
generalization problems, presented either in the context of
a strong or weak sampling cover story. We predict that
when in the context of strong sampling, people will modulate
1The two-category Bayesian strong sampling model is a minor
modification of the one-category strong sampling model described
by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001). The only difference between
that model and the current one lies in how the hypotheses about the
extension of a category (the“consequential regions”) are defined. In
the two-category model the stimulus space is divided into two mu-
tually exclusive regions, one for each category. As per the original
model, category items are assumed to be sampled uniformly at ran-
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Figure 2: The experimental design. The top panel refers to the three sets of stimuli used across each block in the one-category
task. The bottom three panels refer to the three possible sets of stimuli used in the different base rate conditions for the two-
category task (results from the bottom two sets are collapsed into one UNEQUAL BASE RATE condition for the purposes of
analysis). All participants performed the one-category task as well as one of the three two-category tasks. The ticks at the
bottom of each panel show the location of each of the test points for each condition.
their generalization based on cover stories such that they will
tighten their generalization of a category label in response to
observing additional exemplars in that category that do not
extend the category boundary.
Method
Participants Data was collected from 318 participants
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. No demographic informa-
tion was collected so participants remained anonymous. Par-
ticipants were paid $0.50USD for their participation to com-
plete the task which lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Procedure Each participant performed a one-category and
a two-category generalization task in random order following
a scenario adapted from Navarro et al. (2012). In the one-
category task, participants observed instances of temperatures
at which one type of bacteria was found alive in food. They
were then asked to estimate the probability that the same bac-
teria would be found alive in the food at other temperatures.
In the two-category task, participants observed instances of
temperatures where two types of bacteria were found alive
in food. They were also told that the two types of bacteria
competed for resources, so only one type of bacteria could
be found alive in the food at any given temperature. As in
the one-category task, participants were asked to estimate the
probability that one of the two types of bacteria would be
found alive in the food at other temperatures.
The experiment also contained two between-subjects ma-
nipulations. The first was a sampling assumption manipula-
tion in which participants were presented with different cover
stories in order to influence their beliefs about the sampling
process. In the STRONG SAMPLING condition, participants
were told that the instances were selected by scientists who
had identified a number of temperatures where bacteria were
found alive in food. This cover story suggested to the par-
ticipant that the scientists were only selecting positive exam-
ples from the category, consistent with strong sampling. Con-
versely, in the WEAK SAMPLING condition, participants were


























Figure 3: Mean generalization probabilities in the one-
category task across sampling condition and block. Gener-
alization is tighter in the STRONG SAMPLING conditions but
does not differ by block.
cess that tested the bacteria at different temperatures. This
suggested to the participant that the presented instances were
chosen at random from the range of all possible temperatures,
consistent with weak sampling. People who were in a given
sampling condition received the same (strong or weak) sam-
pling cover story for both the one- and two-category tasks.
The other between-subject experimental manipulation var-
ied the base rate in the two-category generalization task. In
the EQUAL BASE RATE condition, the number of instances
observed in both categories was the same. There were also
two conditions in which one category contained more in-
stances: one in which the left category had more and one
in which the right category had more. Because there were no
differences between these two conditions, all analyses col-
lapsed them into one UNEQUAL BASE RATE condition. The
different conditions are illustrated in Figure 2.
In both the one-category and two-category tasks, the in-
stances were presented across three blocks. In the one-
category task, participants initially saw three green dots rep-
resenting temperatures where bacteria was found alive in the
food. They were then asked to estimate (using a slider) the
probability that the bacteria would be found alive at each of
22 temperatures in sequence. As a measure of whether par-
ticipants were performing the task correctly, two of the 22
test trials were located inside the range of observed instances.
After making the 22 judgments, participants were then pre-
sented with two more instances and asked to make the same
judgments again. In the final block, they were presented with
one more instance before repeating the 22 estimates again.
Overall, each participant made 66 judgments (3 blocks × 22
queries) in the one-category task.
The procedure in the two-category task was very similar,
except that participants were presented with instances repre-
senting the temperatures where bacteria from both the left and
right categories were found alive (shown as blue and red dots
respectively of Figure 2). Participants were asked to estimate
the probability that the blue bacteria (the left category) would
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Figure 4: Mean generalization probabilities in the two-
category task across sampling condition, base rate condition,
and block. Generalization is tighter in the STRONG SAM-
PLING condition regardless of category base rate.
of the test points in the two-category task were between the
two categories, except for one within the range of instances
for each of the categories. As in the one-category case, par-
ticipants were given additional instances at the beginning of
each block and then asked to make judgments at each of the
test points. This resulted in a total of 33 judgments (3 blocks
× 11 queries).
Results
Participants who failed to understand the task (based on their
performance on the within-category test points) were ex-
cluded from the analyses. We reasoned that people who cor-
rectly understood the experimental task would have assigned
probabilities close to 100% for the test points within the cate-
gories. Therefore, participants who assigned a probability of
less than 90% on all six test points were removed from that
condition. This left 203 participants in the one-category task
and 165 participants in the two-category task.
Our first question was whether different cover stories about
sampling had an effect on generalization. We examined this
by first looking at the raw generalization probability estimates
provided by participants. Figures 3 and 4 show the mean
generalization probabilities across each condition by block.
Consistent with our predictions, in both tasks the mean gen-
eralization probability was lower (i.e., participants tightened
their generalizations more) in the STRONG SAMPLING con-
dition relative to the WEAK SAMPLING condition (t(201) =
-.290, p < .05 for the one-category task and t(163) = -3.07,
p< .05 for the two-category task).
Another way to determine whether the sampling cover
story had an effect is to fit individual data using the mixed
sampling model from Navarro et al. (2012). This model in-
terpolates between weak and strong sampling assumptions,
assuming that an observation is strongly sampled with prob-
ability θ and weakly sampled with probability 1−θ. We can
use this to calculate a best-fit θ value for each person, reflect-
ing the extent to which their generalizations were consistent
with strong sampling (θ close to 1), weak sampling (θ close































































































































Figure 5: Generalization by block in an additional experiment in which participants were given many more instances in blocks
2 and 3. Generalization probabilities tightened with additional instances, suggesting that earlier lack of tightening was due to
conservative updating rather than rejection of the implications of a strong sampling model.
model was originally developed to model generalization re-
sponses from a single category, we captured participant re-
sponses from the two-category case by treating the left cat-
egory as the single category whose consequential region is
bounded by the leftmost point in the right category. Overall,
the model was able to provide a good account for individual
responses in both tasks, with a median correlation between
the model predictions and participant responses of 0.92 in the
one-category task and 0.96 in the two-category task.
As expected, there were significant individual differences
in inferred θ values as a function of cover story. Calculat-
ing separate beta regressions over condition for each task
(which we did because the distribution of θ values deviated
from normality) shows that type of sampling condition was
a significant predictor of the estimated θ value in both the
one-category (z(3) = -4.23, p < .001), and the two-category
task (z(3) = -4.38, p < .001). Overall, these results suggest
that people did change their generalizations in response to the
cover story, and that the θ parameter in the mixed sampling
model is sensitive to that change.
A related prediction was that increasing the number of in-
stances should result in tighter generalization in the STRONG
SAMPLING condition. We tested this prediction by comparing
generalization probabilities in the first and last (third) block
of test trials (shown in Figures 3 and 4). Although there was
a significant difference between generalization probability in
the first and last blocks in the two-category EQUAL BASE
RATES condition (paired-samples t-test, t(29) = 2.16, p =
0.019), the differences in the one-category task (t(116) =
1.08, p = 0.142) and the two-category UNEQUAL BASE
RATES condition (t(65) = 1.50, p= 0.069) did not reach sig-
nificance.2 Is this because people do not, as predicted by the
strong sampling model, tighten their generalizations with ad-
ditional instances? Or is it simply that people are conserva-
tive, tightening their generalizations less than such a model
would predict?
To investigate this question, we ran an additional experi-
ment involving generalization with 47 participants in the one-
category task and 44 participants in the two-category task.
The experiment was identical to the STRONG SAMPLING con-
dition of the previous one except that participants were shown
many more instances in blocks two and three. As Figure 5
illustrates, when presented with these large amounts of addi-
tional instances people in all conditions and tasks tightened
their generalizations considerably. Each person’s mean gen-
eralization probability in the last block was significantly less
than their generalization in the first block in both the one-
category (t(46) = 4.53, p < .001) and the two-category task
(t(43) = 4.07, p < .001). Within the two-category task, gen-
eralizations tightened significantly in both the EQUAL BASE
RATES (t(14) = 2.31, p= 0.018) and UNEQUAL BASE RATES
(t(28) = 3.27, p= 0.014) condition.3 This pattern of tighten-
ing with more instances is more consistent with a Bayesian
model that includes some proportion of strong sampling than
a standard categorization model like the GCM.
2As expected, all differences in the WEAK SAMPLING conditions
were not significant, with p values ranging from 0.317 to 0.458.
3Recall that this condition incorporated the LOWER BASE RATE
and HIGHER BASE RATE conditions into one analysis in which both
the high-base-rate and low-base-rate left-hand category were com-




This current work clarifies perhaps the most troublesome as-
pect from Navarro et al. (2012): that large individual differ-
ences in proportion of strong and weak sampling assumptions
were observed but people did not seem to be sensitive to the
sampling type suggested by the cover story. By directly ref-
erencing in the cover story how samples were being gener-
ated: either by direct selection for strong sampling or random
occurrence for weak sampling, we find reliable differences
in generalization between the two cover stories in the one-
category condition. This pattern of results is accounted for
naturally by a Bayesian model using a mixture of strong and
weak sampling assumptions (Navarro et al., 2012) and is con-
sistent with standard categorization models such as the GCM
(Nosofsky, 1986) that rely on differences in the specificity
parameter between cover story conditions. We believe the
sampling assumption model account is slightly more parsi-
monious because it a priori predicts that the weak sampling
condition will show wider generalization gradients than the
strong sampling condition, rather than relying on a freely
varying model parameter.
Interestingly, the difference between strong and weak
cover stories is found not only in the one-category but also the
two-category scenario. That this pattern exists not only when
only positive examples of a single category are observed but
also when more than one category is observed, suggests that
beliefs about sampling processes influence behavior even in
situations more traditionally thought of as category learning.
As in the one-category scenario, a model Navarro et al. (2012)
without category learning processes and relying only on dif-
ferent mixtures of sampling assumptions is able to account
for the behavioral results with a high degree of accuracy.
The presence of significant gradient tightening only at large
changes in the number of instances suggests some additional
process is mediating the effect of gradient tightening pre-
dicted by the Bayesian model that incorporates a mixture of
strong and weak sampling. One possibility for such a me-
diating process would be conservatism (Phillips & Edwards,
1966), some reluctance to update beliefs about the bound-
ary of each category as much as is suggested by a rational
model that includes strong sampling. This conservatism may
be due to assumptions that learners might be making about
other possible sampling processes including noisy instance
generation, noisy labelling, or could be the result of cogni-
tive processes that do not weigh each instance equally as the
Bayesian model does (Navon, 1978).
In summary, in both the one- and two-category scenarios,
people had different patterns of generalization from known
instances to new instances based on a cover story that sug-
gested strong or weak sampling was generating the instances
they saw. Additionally, the degree of generalization de-
creased as many more instances were shown from the target
category, more than predicted by standard models of catego-
rization like the GCM but less than predicted by a Bayesian
model that mixed strong and weak sampling. Patterns of
generalization at an individual level for both one- and two-
category scenarios were well accounted for by this Bayesian
model, suggesting people are sensitive to the sampling as-
sumptions that are generating the instances they see during
categorization.
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